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Abstract
Contentious debate surrounds allocation of the geostationary orbit and electromagnetic
spectrum, two resources used by communications satellites.  An extensive economics
literature alleges that the nonmarket administrative allocative procedures now in place are
highly inefficient, but no research has empirically estimated the welfare loss.  This paper
develops a conceptual framework and a computerized model to estimate the economic value
of the resources, the size and distribution of welfare costs associated with the present
regulatory regime, and the potential gains from more market-like allocation.
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ALLOCATION OF ORBIT AND SPECTRUM RESOURCES
FOR REGIONAL COMMUNICATIONS: WHAT'S AT STAKE?
Molly K. Macauley*
A host of telecommunications services -- long-distance telephone calls, television
programs, texts of newspapers and other periodicals, and an increasingly large amount of
intracorporate data -- travel by way of satellite.  Almost without exception, these communica-
tions satellites are situated in a particular orbit in space known as the geostationary orbit.  The
orbit, centered about the equator, is some 170,000 miles long--but two factors limit its use.
One factor is signal interference among neighboring satellites which arises because geo-
stationary satellites communicate at the same electromagnetic frequencies.  To mitigate
interference, regulations on use of the orbit require a physical distance of 800-1600 miles
between satellites.  The second constraint on the use of the orbit is the geographic earth
coverage uniquely associated with each location along the orbit.  Figure 1 indicates the
countries and regions that a satellite can "see" from different locations (identified by
longitudinal degree).1  (Figures follow references at end of paper.)  For example, a satellite at
250 degrees can see the Caribbean, the United States, and Canada.  Such a location would be
advantageous for a "regional satellite" connecting all of these countries, but not if one country
wants the location solely for its own domestic use.
During the heyday of satellite communications in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
communications suppliers clamored for access to the orbit, and increasing orbital congestion
brought acrimonious national and international debate.  Although rapid strides in fiber optic
technology in the late 1980s caused demand for orbit access to level off, debate has recently
resurfaced.  Over 200 satellites now populate the orbit and the waiting list for access includes
companies proposing new services (such as direct-to-home broadcast television and mobile
communications for trucking or airline fleets) and representing newcomers, particularly
developing countries, now entering the market for satellite services.  Perhaps the most
                                               
* Senior Fellow, Energy and Natural Resources Division, Resources for the Future.  This research incorporates
comments from sessions at the American Economic Association meetings and at the Annual Telecommunications
Policy Research Conference, as well as from conference participants at a symposium, "Law and Economics of
Property Rights to Radio Spectrum," hosted by the University of California, Davis.  Comments from Bruce
Hamilton, Harold Demsetz, Eva Kalman, Doug Webbink, Tim Brennan, John Ahearne, an anonymous referee,
and the editor have been particularly helpful.  Portions of this research were funded by Resources for the Future.
Responsibility for errors rests with the author.
1 In this figure, as well as other figures in this paper, representation of degrees longitude uses engineering
convention rather than map-making convention.  The mapping convention distinguishes east and west longitude
by dividing the 360 degree circle into east and west segments of 180 degrees beginning at the prime meridian in
Greenwich, London.  The reader can rescale the figures to be consistent with this convention by subtracting 360
from all points between 180 and 360 degrees and taking their absolute value.Molly K. Macauley RFF 98-10
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dramatic recent demand is a claim by Tonga to 16 geostationary orbital locations that link the
United States and Asia.2
Because the orbit is allocated on a first-come, first-served basis, the inefficiencies and
rent-seeking typically ascribed to such nonprice administration might be expected to arise.
An extensive economics literature has followed these developments, alleging the inefficiency,
unfairness, or both of the regulatory process.3  The literature frequently recommends auctions,
lotteries, or other more marketlike alternatives to administrative allocation, but the literature
has not yet estimated either the size of potential efficiency improvements or the distributional
effects of such alternatives.
This paper describes an empirical approach to suggest the size of benefits from regulatory
change, and infer the direction of gains from trade to respond to political concern about who
would win and who would lose in the event of reform.  Even if regulatory reform were not
undertaken--indeed, it has been resisted by incumbent users of the orbit--an additional reason for
improved understanding of "what's at stake" is the opportunity to make unnecessary, or at least
better inform, the setting of technical operating standards for use of the orbit.  Debate has
typically led to increasingly stringent standards which, while intended to augment the effective
supply of orbit, may also increase the investment and operating costs of satellite technology and
bias technological change (Macauley, 1986, discusses these possible R&D distortions).  In
addition, claimstaking of orbital locations has allegedly been encouraged by two factors: the
anticipation of increasingly burdensome standards and the potential for exempting compliance
by incumbent users of the orbit.4  Even if more marketlike allocation is never implemented, the
approach suggested here could facilitate the present centrally-managed orbit planning process.
                                               
2 See Andrews (1990).  See also Riccitiello and Saunders (1992) and Seitz (1994a,b,c) for discussion of debate
among Pacific Rim countries over orbital access.  de Selding (1992) reports new plans by the European
Community to increase regulation of the orbit to reduce growing congestion and interference.  In addition, the
international debate has recently extended to include access to lower-earth orbits for new services such as
portable telephones (see Andrews, 1992).
3 For example, see Jackson (1978), Agnew and co-authors (1979), Levin (1981, 1988a), Webbink (1981),
Wihlborg and Wijkman (1981), and Sandler and Schulze (1981).  It is important to note that issues in orbit
allocation mirror those in spectrum allocation, for which the U.S. Congress authorized the use of auctions in the
Licensing Improvement Act of 1993.  Prior to this legislation, a large economics literature, spanning some three
decades, had addressed spectrum allocation; for example, see Coase (1959), DeVany and co-authors (1969),
Minasian (1975), Webbink (1981, 1988), and Besen and co-authors (1984).  Levin (1971) and Macauley (1986)
develop quantitative estimates of spectrum shadow values.  Sandler and Schulze (1981) develop Kuhn-Tucker
conditions for joint allocation of spectrum and orbit.  The model developed in this paper takes an approach that
is similar in spirit to, but different in emphasis from, Sandler and Schulze.  They do not consider the "locational
amenities" of orbit or orbit/spectrum substitution possibilities.
4 Speculative claimstaking, without making actual immediate use of the orbit, began as early as 1976 with the
Bogota Declaration, in which a group of equatorial nations officially espoused property rights to the orbit as
extensions of the countries' territorial airspace.  Whether the social costs of claimstaking (delaying the realization
of benefits from resource use) outweigh potential social benefits (when it delays irreversible investment until it is
most socially profitable) is not clear.  Investment is to some extent reversible in the case of the orbit and spectrum,
as satellites can relocate both along the orbit and among regions of the spectrum (see Federal Communications
Commission, 1983).  Levin (1988a) extensively discusses claimstaking.Molly K. Macauley RFF 98-10
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That process has recently begun to accept detailed engineering computer models and these could
be extended to include the approach in this paper.5
The paper first develops and estimates an economic model of the value of locational
attributes of the orbit.  This model replicates the current regulatory regime in which each
satellite is assigned a fixed amount of orbit and no allowance is made for the possibility of
using the orbit at a given location more intensively by, e.g., having proximate satellites
operate at different frequencies.  The principal objective here is to estimate the savings from
operating a satellite at various locations along the geostationary orbit.  The savings are
calculated as the difference between the cost of meeting a given demand by using a satellite at
each location with the cost of meeting the same demand with the best terrestrial alternative.
The result represents the maximum amount that a user would be willing to pay to operate a
satellite at that location.  These estimates are not the equilibrium price that would prevail in
the market for that orbital position, but the estimates do illustrate the costs to various
countries when they are not assigned their preferred (e.g., maximum cost savings) orbital
location.  Differences between preferred and assigned locations demonstrate one approach to
estimating the costs of regulatory allocation that fails to assign a given location to a higher-
valued user.  This version involves a relatively straightforward calculation of relative costs.
The paper then models and estimates the effect of technological substitution possibilities
that economize on the amount of orbit used at any given location.  The engineering literature
describes a variety of such substitution techniques.  For example, satellites may be outfitted
with more complex antennas to use their allocated spectrum bandwidths more intensively at a
"prime" location.6  Administrative allocation of the orbit limits the incentives to exploit these
possibilities because where orbit location values are high, companies confronting such values
would otherwise be induced to use orbit more intensively.
Because the locational attributes of the orbit govern demand for its use, the approach
used in the paper borrows heavily from models of spatial location.  In particular, models
developed to study urban structure as in Mills (1972) and Mills and Hamilton (1984) are
perfectly suited to characterize the orbit.  The analogy with urban location is a powerful one:
just as land values increase with proximity to a central business district as commuting and
other transportation costs fall, orbit values might be expected to increase at locations that
afford the best communications-demand related coverage.  Moreover, just as an increase in
land values leads to substitution towards capital and away from land (hence, skyscrapers are
downtown and multi-acre, single family homes are in the suburbs), so too might an increase in
orbit values lead to more capital-intensive use of the orbit at preferred locations.
To preview conclusions, results show that orbit values are highly sensitive to location
and decline quickly with distance from optimal locations.  When substitution is allowed
between the use of orbit and spectrum (albeit using a restrictive functional form), results
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indicate that the intensity of orbit use in higher-valued locations would be significantly larger
than in lesser-valued locations.  Taken together, these results offer a menu of policy reform,
from improving the way orbit locations are allocated to permitting greater flexibility in
satellite operating requirements.
The next section of the paper briefly describes the orbit and the spectrum.  Section II
outlines a model to estimate orbit shadow values in the case where the orbit and spectrum
must be used in fixed proportions (the current regulatory regime).  Section III models the
effect of allowing orbit and spectrum to be used in variable proportions.  The models are
applied to Central and South America and the Caribbean, and the Pacific Rim, both regions
that have been the subject of the most recent international debate.7  Section IV illustrates for
these regions the welfare costs of regulatory policy that fails to make use of an allocative role
for location values and orbit/spectrum tradeoffs.  Section V offers conclusions.
I.   A NOTE ON THE RESOURCES
The geostationary orbit or "arc" is a particular location in space, about 22,300 miles
above the equator.  In this orbit, the velocity and travel time of satellites just offset the earth's
gravity and 24-hour rotation, and satellites appear to remain as if fixed over the earth.  The
advantage of the geostationary orbit over other, random orbits is the ease of communications--
it allows simultaneous communications within a large region on earth, a satellite's antenna
need only be pointed once at the earth, and antennas on earth need only be pointed once at the
satellite. In regions where terrain or the sparse distribution of population makes alternative
communications technologies more costly, satellites can assume a particularly large role in
providing basic communications infrastructure.  Both developed and developing countries
have long been concerned with access to the geostationary orbit.
The spectrum, or airwaves, is the medium that carries communications signals.
Accordingly, spectrum uses are diverse, including electronic garage door openers, terrestrial
radio and television transmission, and satellites.  Like the orbit, the spectrum also exhibits
locational amenities; for example, satellite frequencies must be high enough to pass through
the earth's atmosphere, whereas terrestrial radio frequencies can be much lower.
The locational amenities of the orbit would be the binding constraint on the resource if
spectrum congestion were negligible; at this limit, satellites would only require separation of
about 40 miles along the orbit to ensure that they do not bump into each other in the natural
drift caused by the solar and gravitational forces of the sun and moon.  In this case, other
satellites could communicate at different frequencies, or be situated at non-interfering distances
from other satellites communicating at the same frequency, or otherwise be "coordinated" in
the timing of their communications.8  Regulatory-specified spectrum assignments limit these
                                               
7 Macauley (1987) applies a limited, earlier version of the model to North America.
8 "Frequency coordination" is practiced voluntarily and extensively among other users of spectrum--a
manifestation of Coase's "theorem"; there is also evidence that satellite operators coordinate their transmissions
to avoid interference (see Federal Communications Commission Report and Order, 1983, paragraph 43).Molly K. Macauley RFF 98-10
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opportunities, however, and the specter of signal interference has led regulators to mandate
orbital separations of from 800 to 1600 or more miles.9
II.   ESTIMATES OF SITE VALUES UNDER THE EXISTING REGULATORY
REGIME: THE FIXED PROPORTIONS CASE
Given that locational differences appear to be the binding constraint on orbital use,
this section outlines an approach to estimating these locational amenities.  In this model
satellite technology is characterized as fixed proportions in its use of orbit and spectrum in
order to suggest the size of inefficiencies associated with the current regulatory regime if
location assignments fail to reflect their highest valued uses.  The pattern of orbit location
values estimated in this section also plays a key role in the more general model of section III
(where some substitution between of orbit and spectrum is permitted).
A.   The Model
The market for satellite-related services ultimately determines the derived demand for a
location in the orbit.  In the model in this section, the quantity demanded of telecommunications
is taken as exogenous and the decision variable is simply the choice of the lowest cost
technology -- satellite-based or terrestrial-based -- to meet demand.  The model calculates the
potential cost savings enabled by using satellite rather than terrestrial technology, when the
satellite is at a given orbital location and has a fixed amount of orbit for operations.  Satellites
may present a cost advantage because they can "see" (or be seen by) and hence interconnect all
geographic areas within its field of view (FOV), whereas terrestrial technologies such as fiber
optics or terrestrial microwaves require an extensive network to interconnect the same set of areas.
The model estimates these cost savings given one location of a satellite, then another,
and so on for each possible location along the orbit.  These savings represent the maximum
amount that a cost-minimizing telecommunications firm would pay for access to a specific
location.  The amount is an upper bound because willingness to pay is also likely to depend
on the savings afforded by other locations.
Equations (1) through (5) below are the building blocks of the simulation model.  For
an output of communications services, Q, production of communications using satellite
(subscript s) or terrestrial technologies (subscript i = 1 to m) is represented by:
Qs = Q(A,S,Hs)  and (1)
Qi = Q(Hi), (2)
                                               
9 The industry has in fact implemented some engineering designs that limit spurious emissions or protect signals
against second party interference.  These steps lead to some possibilities for reduced orbital spacing, but even
larger possibilities from the engineering literature on orbit and spectrum substitution underlie the technology in
Section III.  In addition, interference is reduced if colocated (that is, neighboring) satellites use sufficiently
sophisticated antennas aimed in different directions (say, north to the U.S. and south to Chile).Molly K. Macauley RFF 98-10
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annualized assuming a five percent interest rate, satellite lifetimes of ten years, and fiber
system lifetimes of 25 years.15
Demand
For each country pair, demand is estimated at peak period traffic on a weekday.  The
demand data are based on country populations weighted by the estimated percentages of the
fraction of the population engaged in international communications during peak hours based
on international calling statistics.16  These data are probably satisfactory relative orders-of-
magnitude proxies for other types of telecommunications services such as television broadcast
or text transmission that might be demanded in the regions.17
C.   Estimates of Orbit Site Value
Using these cost and demand data, the model calculates the annualized values of orbit
locations (R).  The curves labeled "Fixed Proportions" in Figures 2 and 3 display these values.
(Figures follow references at end of paper.)  Figure 2 represents North America, Central
America, South America, and the Caribbean nations (referred to as "SoAmer"), and Figure 3
represents Pacific Rim countries ("PacRim").18  Estimates range from $0 to $30 million for
SoAmer and $0 to $27 million for PacRim.
In the case of SoAmer, site values reach a maximum when the number of countries
within view of the satellite is also a maximum.  Tracing the pattern of site values, site values
increase as the number of countries in the field of view increases.  From 0 to 180 degrees,
most of the countries are outside of the field of view.  At 182, Mexico comes within view, and
at 204, about half of the U.S. is in view.  The large jump at 212 reflects the interconnection
with a portion of Canada.  Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela, Bermuda, Guadeloupe, Trinidad,
Barbados, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil next enter (roughly in that order) such
                                               
15 These lifetimes are standard in the engineering literature; see Martin (1978) and Dawidziuk and Preston
(1970) (cited in data appendix).
16 Specifically, following engineering convention, the volume of peak-hour traffic is the volume of ten-minute
calls placed during busy hours.  In addition, and also using engineering data, capacity is sized to minimize the
probability of obtaining a busy signal subject to estimates of consumer willingness to tolerate such a signal.  The
call data reflect existing pricing schemes.  The implications of demand elasticities are considered in Section III.
17 Telephony, television, and text have traditionally represented about 90 percent of commercial satellite
communications traffic until recently; now, about one-third is direct-to-home television and mobile
communications (see Smith, 1996).  See also Acton and Vogelsang (1990) for their observations that calling is
correlated with trade volumes and employment among geographic regions.
18 Countries in the first region are Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, French Polynesia, Guadaloupe, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Trinidad, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  The second region
consists of Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the
Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, and Thailand.  Canada and the United States are also included in
both regions (with international calls assumed to originate and end in Montreal, Los Angeles, and New York
City in the first region, and Ottawa and Los Angeles in the second region).Molly K. Macauley RFF 98-10
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that at 236 to 288, all 29 countries in the SoAmer data set are in the field of view, and site
values are maximized.  The large decline at 320 occurs as Los Angeles is excluded, and at
342, Mexico is outside.  The contribution of satellite links to Canada and the United States is
underscored by site values from 342 to 360; while Canada and the U.S. are not in view at
those locations, 26 out of 29 countries are in view.
The values for the PacRim region exhibit a slightly different relationship between site
values and the field of view.  The relationship is not monotonic with respect to the number of
countries in view of the satellite but also depends on the amount of communications among
them.  For this reason it is notable that in all figures pertaining to the PacRim, site values
remain high when Canada and the U.S. are in view even though large numbers of PacRim
countries are outside the field of view.  From about 30 to 176 degrees, 12 out of 14 of the
PacRim countries are viewable (but Los Angeles and Vancouver are not viewable).  At 176
degrees, Los Angeles enters the field of view, and from 176 to 190, the number of countries
although not the site value is maximized.  From 190 to 216, several countries exit the field of
view, beginning with Singapore and ending with Seoul, and site values decline.  The large
jump at 220 occurs when western Canada comes into view, and from 220 to 226, values are
maximized.  In this region, Australia, western Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New
Guinea, and the west coast of the U.S. are in the viewing range.  Values decline again with the
loss of Australia and Papua New Guinea at 226.  They sharply decrease at 320, where Los
Angeles leaves the field of view.
The magnitude of site values reflects the geographic distribution of population and
land mass, distance and terrain (ocean or land); and income, trade, and other factors that
determine interregional telecommunications patterns.  The small values (around $1 million)
for the orbit locations where the largest number of PacRim countries is within view largely
reflect the relative efficiency of ocean fiber (it is a lower-cost technology when distances
between countries are small and communications traffic is high).19
As a general perspective on the reasonableness of the values, they are overestimated if
the estimated engineering costs of the satellites and ground stations are too small or if
opportunities for scale economies in use of all of the technologies are underexploited in the
simulation.20  Values are underestimated to the extent that domestic communications and
international traffic for services other than telephone service are omitted.  Based on fees for
existing routes that appear to be the most competitive (that is, where multiple satellite- and
                                               
19 This observation is consistent with the treatment in the engineering telecommunications literature of two
subregions, the Greater Pacific and the Western Pacific (see Miglio, undated).  The subregions are identified in
Table 4.
20 The latter occurs if demand were measured at a too disaggregated level.  For example, demand is presently
measured as the sum of traffic between Venezuela and Canada, and between Brazil and Canada.  Greater scale
economies may be realizable if demand were estimated as an aggregation of calls from Venezuela and Brazil to
Canada.  However, doing so would require some additional costs for added telecommunications facilities to
bundle the traffic--more fiber, or use of terrestrial microwave, or additional satellite capacity.Molly K. Macauley RFF 98-10
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IV.   WELFARE COST
The models above illustrate several measures of the social cost of orbit and spectrum
regulation.  For example, what is the cost if a region does not receive its most-preferred, but
its "next-best" preferred location?  Or, what is the cost if a region receives its "least-preferred"
orbital location?
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate estimates of these costs.  The "worst case" costs associated with
fixed proportions are obtained by assuming that regions are assigned their least-preferred orbital
locations.  The smallest welfare loss is obtained by assuming the assignment of second-most
preferred locations.  From Figure 2, the worst case amounts to about $30 million for SoAmer.
In the second-most preferred case, the loss is about $1 million if the locational assignment is to
the west (to the left in Figure 2) and about $23 million if to the east.  From Figures 4 and 5, for
the Western Pacific and Greater Pacific regions, the worst cases are $27.4 million and $2 million,
respectively.  For both of the Pacific regions, the next-best preferred locations moving west
involve loss of connections to the U.S. and Canada and under the demand conditions assumed
here, the social cost is the same as the worst cases. Moving east, the penalty is much smaller.
Table 3. Estimates of Annual Welfare Cost Based on Satellite Location: Central
and South America and the Caribbean  (millions of 1990 dollars)
Fixed Proportions
Least preferred $30.1




Next-best preferred: west .5
east 4.0
Table 4. Estimates of Annual Welfare Cost Based on Satellite Location: Pacific
Rima   (millions of 1990 dollars)
Fixed Proportions
Least preferred $27.4 $2.2
Next-best preferred: west 24.0 2.2
East .15 .1
Variable Proportions
Least preferred $27.0 $1.6
Next-best preferred west 27.0 1.6
East .01 .1
Note:
a The Greater Pacific subregion includes Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Japan, and the
west coasts of Canada and the United States.  The Western Pacific subregion includes all of these
countries and Korea, the Philippines, China, Hong  Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand.Molly K. Macauley RFF 98-10
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intensive spectrum use at high-valued locations), or some combination of the locational and
factor-intensity possibilities.
V.   CONCLUSIONS
These results suggest potential gains from regulatory reform to exploit locational
advantages and substitution opportunities in use of the geostationary orbit and
electromagnetic spectrum.  Although the estimated magnitude of potential savings is small
compared with the size of the worldwide telecommunications industry, the possible savings
are large compared with the telecommunications sector in a developing country or with the
annual budget for communications satellite R&D in the U.S. (about $2 million).  Thus, the
cost savings may well justify attention to regulatory reform.
Clearly a major impediment to realizing such gains, however, is the lack of well-
defined property rights to the orbit.29  Moreover, as Hazlett emphasizes in the context of the
spectrum,30 these rights should probably be specified as a right to the resource, not a license
for operating a communications service.  The difference is that the opportunity conveyed by
the property right to configure a satellite system makes best use of both a location along the
orbit and the quantity of orbit used there, and is a way to ensure that the resource is most
effectively used.
                                               
29 See Levin (1988b) for instances of cash exchanges in extra-market transactions.  Like most mechanisms
operating to circumvent regulatory constraints, a key concern is the extra transactions cost associated with
circumvention.  Would a legitimate market reduce negotiations costs?
30 See prepared statement of Thomas Hazlett (1995), in U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, Hearing on Spectrum Auctions, 12 September, pp. 67-73.Molly K. Macauley RFF 98-10
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DATA APPENDIX
Data Sources and Methodology
Telephone Statistics:  The number and geographic distribution of calls are from International
Telecommunications Yearbook (United Nations, 1992) and The World's Telephones as of
January 1, 1992 (AT&T).  For Haiti and Guatemala, data are not reported but are assumed
equal to statistics for neighboring countries with similarly sized populations.  For Belize,
Bermuda, Cuba, Nicaragua and Jamaica, data are interpolated from years reported to obtain
estimates for 1992.  For countries where data are reported in minutes of calls, data are divided
by 10 to obtain the number of 10 minute calls per year.  Data used in simulation model in text
are estimated number of calls per 10 minute interval during a weekday.  Price data are from
Federal Communications Commission (1991), Table 34, pp. 120 - 122 and AT&T
International Telecommunications Guide (July, 1990).  Price is measured by the sum of the
initial period rate plus the additional per minute rate (for nine additional minutes) at standard
rates.  A regional average is calculated as the unweighted mean of rates for countries in the
region (matched to the "schedule numbers" used to identify country rates).
Latitude and Longitude coordinates for major cities:  Britannica Atlas
Undersea Fiber Optic Costs and Lifetime:  Lee (1987); Miglio (undated and 1988); Federal
Communications Commission (1984); Dawidziuk and Preston (1970).
Satellite Costs and Lifetime:  Lee (1987); conversations with Dave Lee, Director, Ground
Segment Engineering and Development, COMSAT (March 1983); "Satellite Costs" (NASA,
undated mimeo); Martin (1978).
Land Fiber Costs:  Public Utilities Fortnightly (1984), Bell (1984), and conversations with
and information provided by Christopher Pleastsikas (April 1985).
Spectrum Shadow Values: See Macauley (1986a,b).
Income and Population Statistics: World Bank Development Report (1990) and World Bank
Atlas (1990).
Orbit/Spectrum Production Technology: Industry data submitted as background reports to
Federal Communications Commission (1985).  The reports offer summary data on
modulation, polarization schemes, antenna patterns, and other techniques that substitute
between orbit and spectrum while maintaining a constant quality/quantity signal.Molly K. Macauley RFF 98-10
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Figure 1.  Geography of Satellite Footprints showing from which orbital locations, denoted by 
longitudinal degrees, the country or region indicated is within the field of view of the satellite
Source: Reinhart, 1974 










Figure 2.  The Geostationary Orbit:  The Estimated Cost Savings by Satellite Location for Countries in 









































































Figure 3.  The Geostationary Orbit:  The Estimated Cost Savings by Satellite Location for Countries 






















































Figure 4.  The Geostationary Orbit:  The Estimated Cost Savings by Satellite Location for 













































































Figure 5.  The Geostationary Orbit:  The Estimated Cost Savings by Satellite Location for Countries 
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